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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff-Appellee,

:

vs.

:

JEAN MALLOW,

:
:

Case No. 20030867-CA

Argument Priority
Classification Number Two (2)

Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from a Judgment and Conviction for the offense of Distribution
of a Controlled Substance, a Second Degree Felony, in violation of Utah Code Annotated
58-37-8(l)(a)(ii), before the Seventh Judicial District Court in and for Grand County,
State of Utah, the Honorable Lyle R. Anderson, Judge, presiding. Utah Code Annotated
78-21-3(f) confers jurisdiction upon the court of Appeals to hear this Appeal.
ARGUMENT PRIORITY CLASSIFICATION
The above-captioned matter is an appeal from a judgment of conviction and
sentence in a criminal matter wherein the death penalty was not imposed. Therefore,
pursuant to the terms and provisions of Rule 29(b), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, it
should be assigned an Argument Priority Classification Number of Two (2).
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STATEMENT OF ISSUES
1.

Whether counsel for Defendant had a conflict herein in representing both

Defendant and the chief witness against Defendant. The standard of review is set forth in
State v. Velarde, 806 P.2d 1190 (Utah, 1991). Appellate Issued preserved at Tr. 90-91.
2. Whether the trial court erred herein in sentencing Defendant-Appellant
without benefit of a Pre-Sentence Report, and absent authentic, current information
regarding Defendant. The standard of review is set forth in State v. Gomez, 887 P.2d 853
(Utah S.Ct, 1994). Appellate Issue preserved at Sentencing Tr. pp 3-9.
3. Whether the evidence presented at trial herein was legally sufficient to support
conviction of Defendant beyond a reasonable doubt. The standard of review is whether
the jury verdict is supported by substantial evidence beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson
v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307. Appellate issue preserved at Tr. 143.
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS
An interpretation of the following and below cited Constitutional provisions,
Statutes, and Rules is determinative of the issues herein presented:
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
Amendment VI, U.S. Constitution.
STATUTES
Utah Code Annotated, 58-37-8(l)(a)ii.
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RULES
Rule 24, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
As required by the terms and provisions of Rule 24(1 )(b) and Rule 24(f), Utah
Rules of Appellate Procedure, the within Constitutional Provisions, Statutes and Rules are
herein reproduced and incorporated into the Addendum hereto.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is a direct Appeal from afinaljudgment of conviction and sentence in a
criminal case made and entered by the Seventh Judicial Circuit Court in and for Grand
County, State of Utah, Moab City Department, the Honorable Lyle R. Anderson, District
Court Judge, presiding.
In this case, Defendant was convicted, upon jury trial had on September 26, 2003,
of the offense of Distribution of a Controlled Substance, a Second Degree Felony in
violation of Utah Code Annotated 58-37-8 (1953, as amended). On October 7,2003,
Defendant was sentenced to an indeterminate term of incarceration in the Utah State
Prison of not less than one (1) nor more thanfifteen(15) years, said sentence to run
consecutive to any other sentence imposed by any other state, and fined eighteen hundred
andfiftydollars ($1,850.00). Defendant is currently incarcerated at the Utah State Prison
serving said sentence.
The date of imposition of Sentence herein was October 7, 2003. The Notice of
Appeal was filed on October 31, 2003. No Motions were filed pursuant to Rule 50(b),
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53(b), or Rule 59, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, or Rule 24, Utah Rules of Criminal
Procedure, or Utah Code Annotated 77-13-6. Defendant, although presently incarcerated
in the Utah State Prison, does not invoke Rule 4(f), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
On April 9, 2003, Defendant-Appellant Jean Mallow was charged by Information
before the Seventh District Court, Grand County, State of Utah with the offense of
Distribution of a controlled Substance, a Second Degree Felony in violation of Utah Code
Annotated 58-37-8.
On September 26, 2003, Defendant was convicted, upon jury trial, of the above
offense.
On October 7, 2003, Defendant was sentenced by the Honorable Lyle R.
Anderson, District Judge, over counsel's objection to proceeding with sentence without
benefit of a pre-sentence investigation, and in reliance on an outdated report prepared out
of state by an out-of-state agency, to serve an indeterminate term of incarceration in the
Utah State Prison of one (1) to fifteen (15 ) years. A fine was also imposed and said
sentence was ordered to run consecutive to any other sentence imposed by any other state.
Defendant is presently serving a term of imprisonment pursuant to said sentence at the
Utah State Prison.
At jury trial herein, the State presented testimony from one Florence Beattie
Christensen, a.k.a. Florence Carol Beattie, that she purchased methamphetamine from
Defendant-appellant. Said witness was transported to Court from the Utah State Prison,
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where she was then incarcerated. This, upon information and belief, was the only direct
testimonial evidence of the charged transaction.
Further, at the trial herein it was established upon direct and cross-examination of
Ms. Beattie-Christensen and other witnesses, that Ms. Beattie-Christensen had been
offered an accommodation by way of sentencing recommendation in exchange for her
undercover C/I service, and testimony in this and other cases. Said testimony clearly
establishes that defendant-appellant's attorney, one Andrew Fitzgerald, represented the
State's chief witness in the very same proceedings in which she was being offered an
accommodation for in part, in exchange for her testimony against Defendant-Appellant.
Appellant takes the position that this was an impermissible conflict situation that renders
the purported representation of Defendant-Appellant herein a fraud and a sham.
At the conclusion of trial herein, on October 7,2003, Defendant was sentenced by
the trial court without benefit of a pre-sentence investigation to a period of incarceration
consecutive to that imposed by any other state. From that judgment of conviction and
sentence, Defendant-Appellant brings this direct appeal.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On April 9, 2003, Defendant-Appellant Jean Mallow was charged by Information
before the Seventh District Court, Grand County, State of Utah with the offense of
Distribution of a Controlled Substance, a Second Degree Felony in violation of Utah
Code Annotated 58-37-8.
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On September 26, 2003, Defendant was convicted, upon jury trial, of the above
offense.
On October 7, 2003, Defendant was sentenced by the Honorable Lyle R.
Anderson, District Judge, over counsel's objection to proceeding with sentence without
benefit of a pre-sentence investigation, and in reliance on an outdated report prepared out
of state by an out-of-state agency, to serve an indeterminate term of incarceration in the
Utah State Prison of one (1) to fifteen (15 ) years. (Sentencing Transcript, Tr. 5-9). A
fine was also imposed and said sentence was ordered to run consecutive to any other
sentence imposed by any other state. Defendant is presently serving a term of
imprisonment pursuant to said sentence at the Utah State Prison. (Sentencing Transcript,
Tr. 15).
At jury trial herein, the State presented testimony from one Florence Beattie
Christensen, a.k.a. Florence Carol Beattie, that she purchased methamphetamine from
Defendant-appellant. Said witness was transported to Court from the Utah State Prison,
where she was then incarcerated. (Tr. 85). This, upon information and belief, was the
only direct testimonial evidence of the charged transaction. (Tr. 84, et. seq.).
Ms. Christensen testified that she had known Defendant-Appellant for a long time,
five years, that she had dated Ms. Mallow's brother and that she had no enmity towards
Ms. Mallow. (Tr. 107). She testified that her services to police were provided in this
case to set her life straight and in exchange for certain accommodations from the State in
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exchange for her assistance. (Tr. 83, 95, 98, 99).
Further, at trial herein, Ms. Christensen testified that she arranged the purchase of
methamphetamine from Defendant-Appellant herself, in order to receive certain legal
accommodations and benefits therefrom in exchange for her assistance to police. (Tr. 8687). She testified that she set up the buy herself and then contacted police to accompany
her to make the buy. (Tr. 87). She testified that she made the buy herself directly from
Defendant-Appellant Jean Mallow, in the quantity of one-quarter gram of
methamphetamine and that she gave Defendant-Appellant cash payment in marked bills
for said substance. (Tr. 88).
The police witnesses who testified for the State herein testified that they were
present at the time of the alleged controlled buy herein, that they provided marked bills
for the purpose of said controlled buy, and that they met with the chief State's witness,
Ms. Beattie-Christensen, both before and immediately after the buy, that they searched
her and her vehicle and that she was not in possession of any drugs prior to the controlled
transaction and that she was in possession of one quarter gram of methamphetamine
immediately after the transaction. Although they monitored the transaction by wire,
neither officer was able to substantiate that the voice appearing on the wire and on the
tape made of the transaction was that of Defendant-Appellant Jean Mallow. (Tr. 21, 23,
28,34,50-51,71).
In addition to the above, the State offered testimony from its Drug Expert, one
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Kevin Smith, that he received a purported bindle of the substance obtained in the
controlled buy situation, that he tested said substance, and that he found said substance to
contain methamphetamine. (Tr. 79-83, Exhibit 2 and 3).
Further, at trial herein, Defendant-Appellant's counsel, one Andrew Fitzgerald,
upon cross-examination of the State's chief witness, and only eye-witness, elicited
testimony that he had previously represented the witness on a case in Grand County.
(TR.93). Unbeknownst to Defendant-appellant at that time, this case, as it develops, was
one of the same cases Ms. Beattie-Christensen, partly in exchange for her testimony
against Appellant, had been offered accommodation and a recommendation in exchange
for her undercover services and testimony. In direct examination by the prosecutor of
Corporal Archie Walker, the chief narcotics officer involved in the case, the following
colloquy is had:
Q.

Did you also agree that as far as her Grand County case, that you would agree

to seek a recommendation of a small punishment for what she had done here?
A.

Yes, ma'am. (Tr. at 54-55)

That this was the same case in which Mr. Fitzgerald represented the State's
witness is established again in direct examination by Ms. Morgan at Tr. 91:
Q.

So you're currently serving a commitment for the case that brought you in

touch with Archie Walker?
A.

Yes, I am.
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Q.

And that's a felony conviction, isn't it?

A.

Yes. It's a zero to five felony conviction.

Q.

And do you recall what the exact crime was that you're serving the time for?

A.

Possession of traceable amounts of Ritalin and drug paraphernalia. (Tr. at

91).
Thus, the transcript and record of this case establish clearly that Defense-counsel,
Mr. Fitzgerald had represented both Defendant-Appellant and the State's chief witness
and that he represented his client, Ms. Beattie-Christensen in the same case in which she
was being offered a sentencing recommendation or accommodation partly in exchange for
testimony against his client Jean Mallow, Defendant-Appellant herein. (Tr.91).
At the conclusion of trial herein, on October 7, 2003, Defendant was sentenced by
the trial court, without benefit of a Pre-sentence investigation, to a period of incarceration
in the Utah State Prison, said judgment and sentence to be consecutive to that imposed by
any other state. From that Judgment of Conviction Defendant-Appellant brings this
direct appeal.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Defendant's counsel was inappropriately conflicted herein inasmuch as he
represented both Defendant-appellant and the chief witness against Defendant-appellant
on one of the very cases the witness was receiving accommodation for, partly in exchange
for her testimony against Defendant Appellant. Additionally, the trial court erred in
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proceeding to sentence Defendant-appellant without benefit of a Pre-Sentence Report and
without access to current authentic information Regarding Defendant-Appellant. Finally,
the evidence presented herein was and is legally insufficient to support Defendant's
conviction.
ARGUMENT

POINT I.
DEFENSE COUNSEL HEREIN WAS INAPPROPRIATELY
CONFLICTED IN HIS REPRESENTATION OF
BOTH DEFENDANT-APPELLANT AND
THE CHIEF WITNESS AGAINST
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT
At jury trial herein, the State presented testimony from one Florence BeattieChristensen, a.k.a. Florence Carol Beattie, that she purchased methamphetamine from
Defendant-Appellant. Said witness was transported to Court from the Utah State Prison,
where she was then incarcerated. This, upon information and belief, was the only direct
testimonial evidence of the charged transaction.
Defendant-Appellant's counsel, one Andrew Fitzgerald, upon cross-examination
of the State's chief witness, and only eye-witness, elicited testimony that he had
previously represented her on a case in Grand County. (TR.93). Unbeknownst to
Defendant-Appellant at that time, this case, as it develops, was one of the same cases Ms.
Beattie-Christensen partly in exchange for her testimony against Appellant, had been
offered accommodation and a recommendation for in exchange for her undercover
10

services and testimony. In direct examination by the prosecutor of Corporal Archie
Walker, the chief narcotics officer involved in the case, the following colloquy is had:
Q.

Did you also agree that as far as her Grand County case, that you would agree

to seek a recommendation of a small punishment for what she had done here?
A.

Yes, ma'am. (Tr. at 54-55)

That this was the same case in which Mr. Fitzgerald represented the State's
witness is established again in direct examination by Ms. Morgan at Tr. 91:
Q.

So you're currently serving a commitment for the case that brought you in

touch with Archie Walker?
A.

Yes, I am.

Q.

And that's a felony conviction, isn't it?

A.

Yes. It's a zero tofivefelony conviction.

Q.

And do you recall what the exact crime was that you're serving the time for?

A.

Possession of traceable amounts of Ritalin and drug paraphernalia. (Tr. at

91; See also Appendix E).
It is well established as a matter of law that an accused in a criminal matter is
entitled under the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States to be
represented by vigorous, independent counsel at every stage of the proceedings against
the accused, and that counsel must exercise his serious responsibility to Defendant in a
manner consistent with the rights and interests of Defendant. U.S. Constitution,
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Amendment VI; State v. Bakalov, 979 P.2d 799 (Utah, 1997); State v. Heaton, 958 P.2d
911 (Utah 1993); State v. Velarde, 806 P.2d 1190 (Ut. App., 1991); State v. FFe&6, 790
P.2d 65 (Ut. App. 1990); State v. Humphrey, 793 P.2d 918 (Ut. App., 1990).
The Sixth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, provides:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right
to a speedy and public trial by an impartial jury of the State
and district wherein the crime shall have been committed . . .
to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be
confronted with the witnesses against him; to have
compulsory (process)for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and
to the assistance of counsel for his defense...
Thus a criminal defendant's right to counsel is established and set forth by the
Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution, State v. Bakalov, 979 P.2d 799, 808
(Ut. 1997). If the accused is indigent, he is entitled, as here, to court appointed counsel.
State v. Heaton, 958 P.2d 911, 917. "The right to have the assistance of counsel at trial is
a fundamental constitutional right jealously protected by the trial Court." Id. Gideon v.
Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344, 84 S.Ct. L.Ed. 2d 799 (1963). Under our system of
justice, the right to counsel includes the right to be represented by strong, independent
counsel whose effectiveness is not undermined by conflicts of interest.
In State v. Webb, supra, the Utah Court of Appeals enunciated the legal standard
applicable to the instant situation:
The Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of
counsel includes the right to counsel free from conflicts of
interest... Ordinarily, a claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel must be analyzed under the two-pronged test set forth
12

in Strickland. Under that standard, a criminal defendant must
show both that his counsel's performance was deficient and
that it prejudiced his defense. However, a sixth amendment
claim grounded on conflict of interest is a special subtype of
ineffectiveness claim, which must be examined under a
somewhat different standard. (Ibid, at 72)

Because the alleged conflict in this case was not
adequately raised in the trial court until after his conviction,
Webb can succeed on his sixth amendment ineffectiveness of
counsel claim only if he demonstrates both that counsel
actively represented conflicting interests and that an actual
conflict of interest adversely affected his lawyer's
performance.
In order to show an actual conflict of interest existed, a
defendant must point to specific instances in the record to
suggest an actual conflict or impairment of his or her interests
. . . There is no violation where the conflict is irrelevant or
merely hypothetical; there must be an actual, significant
conflict. (Ibid, at 75).
In State v. Humphrey, supra, this Court further stated:
We next turn to the actual conflict standard as
articulated in Cuyler, 446 U.S. at 849, 100 S.Ct. At 1718.
Defendant has the burden to show with some specificity that
an actual conflict of interest adversely affected his
representation.
Defendant must show that counsel actively represented
conflicting interests and that an actual conflict of interest
adversely affected his lawyer's performance . . . (Ibid at 923)

Applying the rationale of the above cited cases to the facts in the instant case, it is
clear that Defendant's counsel herein was conflicted in representing both Defendant13

Appellant and the chief witness, and only eye-witness, against Defendant-Appellant. This
is particularly clear in this situation where Appellant's counsel represented the State's
chief witness in certain of the very proceedings in which she was being offered a
sentencing accommodation in exchange for her services in this and other cases.
It should also be noted that the record herein is silent with respect to this clear
conflict situation. Nothing in the record indicates that Defendant-appellant was aware,
(which she was not), that her counsel had represented the chief witness against her in the
very same case in which she was seeking accommodation from the authorities in
exchange for her trial testimony against Defendant. No waiver is found in the file. So far
as counsel can determine, no record was ever made on this point. Indeed, it appears not
to have been noticed or considered by anyone until Appellate counsel dredged it up from
the Transcript. Clearly, the conflicted counsel, Mr. Fitzgerald appears never to have
disclosed this information either to the Court or to Defendant. Presumably, the State's
Attorney, Ms. Morgan, because of her involvement in both proceedings must have been
aware of this situation, either as it was developing or as it developed. She, too, appears to
have taken no action in the premises. This Court should immediately redress this clear
Sixth Amendment violation, vacate and set aside the Judgment of Conviction and
Sentence, and remand this matter for a new trial.
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POINT II.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED HEREIN IN PROCEEDING TO SENTENCE
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT WITHOUT BENEFIT OF A PRESENTENCE REPORT AND WITHOUT ACCESS TO
CURRENT, AUTHENTIC INFORMATION
REGARDING DEFENDANTAPPELLANT

It is well established as a matter of law that a Defendant in a criminal proceeding is
entitled to fundamental due process protections during the sentencing process. Said
fundamental due process protections have been construed by the Supreme Court of the
State of Utah, this and other courts to include the right to be privy to information received
and reviewed by the sentencing court and the right to review, and respond to and rebut
erroneous allegations and information contained therein so that the sentencing process is,
to the extent reasonably possible, grounded upon authentic, accurate and reasonably
reliable information. United States ex. Rel. Collins, (C.A. 3 Pa.) 204 F.2d 264; State v.
Lipsky, 608 P.2d 1241 (Utah, 1980); State v. Gomez, 887 P.2d 853 (Utah S. Ct., 1994);
State v. Hanson, 627 P.2d 53 (Utah, 1981); Shield v. Nevada, 634 P.2d 469 (Nev. S. Ct.,
2982); State v. Skaff, 447 N.W. 2d 84 (Wise, C.A., 1989); Scott v. Maryland, 426 A.2d
923 (Maryland Ct. App. 1981); State v. Tanner, 332 S.E. 2d 277 (W. Va. S. Ct., 1985); 21
AmJur. 2d., Criminal Law, Section 596; 3 L. Ed. 2d 1808, Due Process Requirements of
Presentence Procedure.
In State v. Gomez, supra, the Supreme Court of the State of
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Utah stated:
"Due process, as guaranteed by both the United States and
Utah Constitutions, requires criminal proceedings to be
conducted to insure that the decision-making process is based
upon accurate and reasonably reliable information. Thus, a
defendant is entitled to due process protections during
sentencing to prevent procedural unfairness. Fundamental
principles of procedural fairness in sentencing require that a
defendant have the right to examine and challenge the
accuracy and reliability of the factual information upon which
his sentence is based." (Ibid, at 854, 855).
Similarly, in State v. Lipsky, supra, the Supreme Court of the State of Utah again
stated:
"In sum, there is no doubt that the conviction of a criminal
offense itself, without consideration of the punishment,
represents a societal condemnation against an individual that
may be a painful, humiliating, and degrading experience. The
great majority of our laws and rules of evidence pertaining to
criminal trials seek to guarantee those accused of criminal
conduct their constitutional right to a fair trial insofar as the
determination of guilt is concerned. Fewer safeguards exist
which insure fairness in the punishment phase, even though it
is the punishment which in fact often has a far more profound
impact on a person than the finding of guilt. The fair
administration of justice at the least requires that the
information upon which the judge relies in imposing
punishment is accurate." (Ibid, at 1249).
Applying the above-cited cases and authority to the facts in the instant case, it is
clear that no Pre-Sentence Report was prepared herein by Adult Probation and Parole
precedent to imposition of sentence, that the trial court received and reviewed prior to
imposition of sentence, at the behest of the State, an outdated and inaccurate "report"
prepared by an out-of-state agency, and that the impact of said inaccurate and prejudicial
16

information was such that it compromised the integrity of the sentencing process in this
case and contaminated the objectivity of the sentencing judge. As noted in many if not
most of the above-cited cases, the sentencing process must be grounded upon authentic,
accurate and reasonably reliable information in order to meet the requirements of
fundamental due process, as enunciated in the above cited cases. And even assuming,
arguendo, that the trial court below correctly permitted consideration of the objected to
foreign Pre-Sentence Report, and that there was no error in so doing, there yet remains the
collateral issue of whether Defendant-Appellant was accorded a meaningful opportunity
to respond to and rebut same. We submit that she was not.
Our position is, quite simply, that there can be no doubt that the above-said
improperly received and considered materials and information contaminated the
sentencing process herein and contaminated the objectivity of the sentencing court, in
derogation of Defendant-Appellant's right to fundamental due process protections during
the sentencing process. Further, our position is that this Court cannot permit such a
travesty as this to pass unchallenged because it constitutes a challenge to the rational and
logical underpinnings of our judicial system. The courts are one of the few remaining
havens of reason, logic and objectivity remaining. The calm of temperate and rational
judicial deliberation must not and cannot be permitted to be disrupted by the emotionally
charged over-reaching of those who seek to inflame and prejudice those calm
deliberations by the introduction of irrational elements into the sentencing process. The
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legal process must remain a fortress of rationality and calm deliberation and must not be
permitted to degenerate into a vehicle for recrimination and revenge.

POINT III.
THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED HEREIN WAS LEGALLY INSUFFICIENT
TO SUPPORT DEFENDANT'S
CONVICTION

It is well established as a matter of law that the totality of the evidence in a
criminal case must be sufficient to support the conviction of defendant beyond all
reasonable doubt and that a failure on the part of the State's evidence to so establish
requires the acquittal of defendant. State v. Johnson, 11A P.2d 1147 (Utah, 1989); State v.
Cobb, 11A P.2d 1123 (Utah, 1989); State v. James, 819 P.2d 781 (Utaih, 1991); State v.
Lamm, 606 P.2d 231 (Utah, 1980); State v. Hamilton, 827 P.2d 232 (Utah, 1992).
In reviewing a claim of insufficiency of evidence in a criminal case, the Appellate
Court does not sit as a second fact finder, determine guilt or innocence, or otherwise
substitute its judgment for that of the jury. Lamm, 606 P.2d at 231; State v. James, 819
P.2d 781, 784 (Utah 1991). The jury alone weighs the evidence and determines the
credibility of witnesses. Lamm, 606 P.2d at 231. Accordingly, when reviewing an
insufficiency claim, the Appellate Court' View[s] the evidence and all reasonable
inferences drawn therefrom in a light most favorable to the jury verdict." State v.
Hamilton, 827 P.2d 232 (Utah, 1992).
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The Court will reverse a jury verdict for insufficient evidence "only when the
evidence, so viewed, is sufficiently inconclusive or inherently improbable that reasonable
minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the crime
of which he was convicted." State v. Petree, 659 P.2d 443, 444 (Utah 1983), superceded
by rule on other grounds, State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191 (Utah 1987). In other words, the
Court will sustain a jury verdict so long as there is "any evidence or reasonable inferences
that can be drawn from the evidence from which the jury could make findings of all the
elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." State v. Brown, 853 P.2d 851, 860
(Utah 1992).
In this case the evidence was clearly insufficient such that reasonable minds must
have entertained a reasonable doubt in weighing and considering the evidence. In
evaluating a claim of insufficient evidence this Court looks at the evidence and the
reasonable inferences which may be drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the
jury verdict. State v. Johnson, 114 P.2d 1141, 1147 (Utah 1989). A jury conviction is
reversed for insufficient evidence only when the evidence, so viewed is sufficiently
inconclusive or inherently improbable that reasonable minds must have entertained a
reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the crime of which he was convicted. Id.
State v. Cobb, 774 P.2d, 1123, 1128 (Utah 1989).
In the instant case, even when viewed in a light most favorable to the jury verdict,
the evidence is so inconclusive and inherently improbable that reasonable minds must
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have entertained a reasonable doubt herein. The State's chief witness, and only eye
witness was a convicted felon with a long (and admitted) history of drug involvement,
and her testimony was only elicited in exchange for substantial consideration. The
purported "controlled buy" herein was a joke inasmuch as no thorough search of the
undercover C.I. was made, nor could have been made, by supporting officers, because of
her sex. The purported "marked bills" were never recovered from Defendant-Appellant
nor anyone else, and the monitoring officers, by their own admission, were not in a
position to monitor or observe the transaction or its aftermath. Add to this mix, the
history of enmity between Defendant-Appellant and the witness and there you have it:
Reasonable minds must have entertained doubt about the veracity and credibility of the
purported chief witness and must have entertained a reasonable doubt that DefendantAppellant committed this crime. Thus, the jury verdict herein can only be seen as an
unfortunate aberration.
Defendant-Appellant respectfully requests that this Court review, weigh and
consider the evidence herein, applying the standards of the above cited cases and
authority to the established facts. Defendant-Appellant is confident the Court, applying
the standards of Petree, Walker, Johnson and Cobb, can only conclude that the evidence
adduced herein was legally insufficient to support Defendant's conviction. This Court
should reverse the judgment of conviction and sentence herein and remand this matter for
a new trial.
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CONCLUSION
Defendant's counsel was inappropriately conflicted herein inasmuch as he
represented both Defendant-Appellant and the chief witness against Defendant-Appellant
on one of the very cases the witness was receiving accommodation for, partly in exchange
for her testimony against Defendant-Appellant. Additionally, the trial court erred in
proceeding to sentence Defendant-Appellant, over objection of counsel, without benefit
of a Pre-Sentence Report and without access to current authentic information regarding
Defendant-Appellant. Finally, the evidence presented herein was and is legally
insufficient to support Defendant's conviction. This Court should vacate and set aside the
judgment of conviction and sentence herein and remand this matter for a new trial.
DATED this

b

v

day of May 2004.
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SEVENTH DISTRICT COURT
Grand County
-ILED

^Y-

IN THE SEVENTH DISTRICT COURT

APR 0 9 2003
:,LERK OF THE COURT
Deputy

IN AND FOR GRAND COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

NO.

^rr

c

Oi

1L_l

vs.
INFORMATION
JEAN MALLOW,
AKA ALICE LAJEAN FINNEY,
AKA JEAN CRAIN,
AKA JEAN DIEHL,
DOB: 07/18/1964
Defendant.
THE UNDERSIGNED COMPLAINANT, HAPPY J. MORGAN, states on
information and belief that the defendant committed, in the
above-named county, the crimes of:
DISTRIBUTION OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE, a SECOND DEGREE FELONY,
in violation of Section 58-37-8(1)(a)(ii), Utah Code Annotated,
1953 as amended, in that the said defendant, on or about
September 22, 2 002, at Grand County, State of Utah, did
distribute, or agree, consent, offer or arrange to distribute a
controlled substance, i.e. methamphetamine.

^

J

This information is based upon evidence received from
the following witnesses: Grand/San Juan Strike Foirce.
DATED this

^

day of April, 2003.

Happy J. Morgan
Grand County Attorney

Appendix B.
ORDER OF JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION AND SENTENCE

^ E0

OCT 0 7 2003
CLERK OF THE CaURT

IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT

r-puty y ~~

IN AND FOR GRAND COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
Criminal No. 0317-094
Held in the Courtroom of said Court, at Moab, Grand
County, State of Utah, on October 07, 2003, present the Honorable
Lyle R. Anderson, District Court Judge.
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Against:

JEAN MALLOW, aka Alice LaJean Finney, Jean Crain, Jean
Diehl,
DOB: 07/18/1964
JUDGMENT AND COMMITMENT TO UTAH STATE PRISON

Happy J. Morgan for Plaintiff
Tom Jones for Defendant
This being the day and hour fixed for pronouncing
judgment in this case, and the defendant being present in Court
and represented by counsel, and defendant having heretofore been
found guilty by a jury of the offense of:
DISTRIBUTION OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE, a Second Degree Felony,
and the defendant staring 10 uhe Court that rhere is no legal
reason to advance why judgment should not be pronounced, the
Court now pronounces the judgment and sentence of the law as
follows, to-wit:

That you, JEAN MALLOW, are hereby imprisoned in

the UTAH STATE PRISON for a term of NOT LESS THAN ONE (1) YEAR
1

NOR MORE THAN FIFTEEN (15) YEARS.

You are further ORDERED to pay

a fine and assessment in the total amount of $1,850.00 and pay
restitution to Grand County for the services of your public
defender in the amount of $500.00.
Said prison term is to be served consecutively to any
other sentence imposed by any other state.
You are hereby REMANDED to the custody of the Grand
County Sheriff or other proper officer for transfer to the
custody of the Utah State Prison.

^>cU\>f

DATED this / 7^ day of _±jO_

2003.

BY THE COURT:

Ly2r£ R. Anderson
district Court Judg^K

^ A ^ O O ^ ^J/S^

Happy J. Morgan
Grand County Attorney

HS^'CTCO^

2

CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I hereby certify that on the ~H^~day

of

(^) ^!7rr

/

2003, I hand delivered or mailed, postage prepaid, a true and
correct copy of the above to Tom Jones, Attorney for Defendant,
211 East Broadway, #217, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111; Department
of Corrections, Adult Probation and Parole, 1165 S. Hwy. 191, St.
3, Moab, Utah
Utah

84532.

84532; Grand County Sheriff, 125 E. Center, Moab,
do

* f\v\0

*C^y

.

3

CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION
I certify that a copy of the attached document was sent to the
following people for case 031700094 by the method and on the date
specified.
METHOD
Mail

Fax
By Hand
By Hand
By Hand

Dated this

2^

day of

OAL

NAME
TOM JONES
ATTORNEY DEF
211 EAST 3 00 SOUTH
SUITE 217
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 84111
UTAH STATE PRISON
HAPPY J MORGAN
AP&P
GRAND COUNTY SHERIFF'S
OFFICE
., 20 p S

Page 1 (last)

Appendix C.
FULL TEXT OF DISPOSITIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS HEREIN CITED

Amend. I

UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION
CHARLES COTESWORTH
PINCKNEY,
CHARLES PINCKNEY,
PIERCE BUTLER.

f »i»«irt»i;i

W 11.1.1 AM F E W .
ABR BALDWIN.

AMENDMENT 11
(Right to bear arms.]
A w«ll rrculntrd Militin. bfMnc n^f" «?v 1o ihr 5^.
ctmty o( ;\ !><*<• Stntc, the right <»l tin- |»"nple hi keep
and bear Arms, shall not be infringH

In Convention Monday September 17th 1787.
Present The States of

438

AMENDMENT III
(Quartering soldiers.l

New Hampshire. Massachusetts, Connecticut, Mr.
Hamilton from New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina,
South Carolina and Georgia. Resolved,

No Soldier shall, in time of peace, W quartered m
any house, without the consent of the Owner, nor in
time of war, but in a manner to be prescribed by law.

That the preceding Constitution be laid before the
United States in Congress assembled, and that it is
the Opinion of this Convention, that it should afterwards be submitted to a Convention of Delegates,
chosen in each State by the People thereof, under the
Recommendation of its Legislature, for their Assent
and Ratification; and that each Convention assenting
to, and ratifying the Same, should give Notice thereof
to the United States in Congress assembled.

AMENDMENT IV

Resolved, That it is the Opinion of this Convention,
that as soon as the Conventions of nine States shall
have ratified this Constitution, the United States in
Congress assembled should fix a Day on which Electors should be appointed by the States which shall
have ratified the same, and a day on which the Electors should assemble to vote for the President, and
the Time and Place for commencing Proceedings under this Constitution. That after such Publication the
Electors, should be appointed, and the Senators and
Representatives elected: That the Electors should
meet on the Day fixed for the Election of the President, and should transmit their Votes certified,
signed, sealed and directed, as the Constitution requires, to the Secretary of the United States in Congress assembled, that the Senators and Representatives should convene at the Time and Place assigned;
that the Senators should appoint a President of the
Senate, for the sole Purpose of receiving, opening and
counting the Votes for President; and, that after he
shall be chosen, the Congress, together with the President, should, without Delay, proceed to execute this
Constitution.
By the Unanimous Order of the Convention.
Go. WASHINGTON, Presidt. W. JACKSON, Secretary.

AMENDMENTS TO THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES
AMENDMENTS IX (BILL OF RIGHTS1
AMENDMENTS XI-XXVII
AMENDMENT I
(Religious and political freedom.]
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the
press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of
grievances.

(Unreasonable searches and scizures.l
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and
no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by Oath or affirmation, an<! particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons
or things to be seized.
AMENDMENT V
(Criminal actions — Provisions concerning —
Due process of law and just compensation
clauses.]
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or
otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment
or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising
in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in
actual service in time of War or puhlic danger, nor
shall any person be subject for the same offence to be
twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against
himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law; nor shall private property
be taken for public use, without just compensation.
AMENDMENT VI
[Rights of accused.!
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy
the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial
jury of the^State and district wherein the crime shall
have been committed, which district shall have been
previously ascertained by law, and to he informed of
the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor,
and to have the Assistance of counsel for his defence.
AMENDMENT VII
(Trial by jury In civil cases.]
In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by
jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury,
•hall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the
United States, than according to the rules of the common law.
AMENDMENT VIII
(Bail

Punishment]

Appendix D.
FULL TEXT OF DISPOSITIVE STATUTES AND RULES CITED HEREIN
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(vi) impose a civil penalty of not more than $1,000
for each dispensed prescription regarding which the
required information is not submitted.
(b) Civil penalties
assessed
under
Subsection
(l2XaXvi) shall be deposited in the General Fund as a
dedicated credit to be used by the division under Subsection 58-37-7.7(1).
(c) The procedure for determining a civil violation of
this Subsection (12) shall be in accordance with Section
58-1-108, regarding adjudicative proceedings within the
division.
(13) An individual who has submitted information to the
database in accordance with this section may not be held
civilly liable for having submitted the information.
(14) All department and the division costs necessary to
establish and operate the database shall be funded by appropriations from:
(a) the Commerce Service Fund; and
(b) the General Fund.
(15) All costs associated with recording and submitting
data as required in this section shall be assumed by the
submitting drug outlet.
2003
58-37-7.7.

Use of d e d i c a t e d credits — Controlled Substance D a t a b a s e — Collection of penalties.
(1) The director may, with concurrence of the Controlled
Substance Database Advisory Committee created in Section
58-37-7.5, use the monies deposited in the General Fund as a
dedicated credit under Subsections 58-37-6(8Xa), 58-377.5(llXc), and 58-37-7.5(12Xb) for the following purposes:
(a) maintenance and replacement of the database
equipment, including hardware and software;
(b) training of staff; and
(c) pursuit of external grants and matching funds.
(2) The director of the division may collect any penalty
imposed under Subsections 58-37-6X8)(a), 58-37-7.5(llXc), and
58-37-7.5(12Xb) and which is not paid by:
(a) referring the matter to the Office of State Debt
Collection or a collection agency; or
(b) bringing an action in the district court of the county
in which the person owing the debt resides or in the
county where the office of the director is located.
(3) The director may seek legal assistance from the attorney general or the county or district attorney of the district in
which the action is brought to collect the fine.
(4) The court shall award reasonable attorney's fees and
costs to the division for successful collection actions under
Subsection (2Xb).
(5) All funding of t h e controlled substance database as
denned under Section 58-37-7.5 is nonlapsing.
2003
58-37-8. Prohibited a c t s — Penalties.
(1) Prohibited acts A — Penalties:
(a) Except as authorized by this chapter, it is unlawful
for any person to knowingly and intentionally:
(i) produce, manufacture, or dispense, or to possess
with intent to produce, manufacture, or dispense, a
controlled or counterfeit substance;
(ii) distribute a controlled or counterfeit substance,
or to agree, consent, offer, or arrange to distribute a
controlled or counterfeit substance;
(iii) possess a controlled or counterfeit substance
with intent to distribute; or
(iv) engage in a continuing criminal enterprise
where:
(A) the person participates, directs, or engages
in conduct which results in any violation of any
provision of Title 58, Chapters 37, 37a, 37b, 37c,
or 37d t h a t is a felony; and
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(B) the violation is a part of a continuing
series of two or more violations of Title 58,
Chapters 37, 37a, 37b, 37c, or 37d on separate
occasions t h a t are undertaken in concert with
five or more persons with respect to whom the
person occupies a position of organizer, supervisor, or any other position of management.
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (lXa)
with respect to:
(i) a substance classified in Schedule I or II, a
controlled
substance
analog,
or
gammahydroxybutyric acid as listed in Schedule III
is guilty of a second degree felony and upon a second
or subsequent conviction is guilty of a first degree
felony;
(ii) a substance classified in Schedule III or IV, or
marijuana, is guilty of a third degree felony, and upon
a second or subsequent conviction is guilty of a second
degree felony; or
(iii) a substance classified in Schedule V is guilty of
a class A misdemeanor and upon a second or subsequent conviction is guilty of a third degree felony.
(c) Any person who has been convicted of a violation of
Subsection (lXaXii) or (iii) may be sentenced to imprisonment for an indeterminate term as provided by law, but if
the trier of fact finds a firearm as defined in Section
76-10-501 was used, carried, or possessed on his person or
in his immediate possession during the commission or in
furtherance of the offense, the court shall additionally
sentence the person convicted for a term of one year to run
consecutively and not concurrently; and the court may
additionally sentence the person convicted for an indeterminate term not to exceed five years to run consecutively
and not concurrently.
(d) Any person convicted of violating Subsection
(lXaXiv) is guilty of a first degree felony punishable by
imprisonment for an indeterminate term of not less than
seven years and which may be for life. Imposition or
execution of the sentence may not be suspended, and the
person is not eligible for probation.
(2) Prohibited acts B — Penalties:
(a) It is unlawful:
(i) for any person knowingly and intentionally to
possess or use a controlled substance analog or a
controlled substance, unless it was obtained under a
valid prescription or order, directly from a practitioner while acting in the course of his professional
practice, or as otherwise authorized by this chapter;
(ii) for any owner, tenant, licensee, or person in
control of any building, room, tenement, vehicle, boat,
aircraft, or other place knowingly and intentionally to
permit them to be occupied by persons unlawfully
possessing, using, or distributing controlled substances in any of those locations; or
(iii) for any person knowingly and intentionally to
possess an altered or forged prescription or written
order for a controlled substance.
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection
(2XaXi) with respect to:
(i) marijuana, if the amount is 100 pounds or more,
is guilty of a second degree felony;
(ii) a substance classified in Schedule I or II, marijuana, if the amount is more t h a n 16 ounces, but less
than 100 pounds, or a controlled substance analog, is
guilty of a third degree felony; or
(iii) marijuana, if the marijuana is not in the form
of an extracted resin from any part of the plant, and
the amount is more than one ounce but less than 16
ounces, is guilty of a class A misdemeanor.

(c) Any person convicted of violating Subsection
(2Xa)(i) while inside the exterior boundaries of property
occupied by any correctional facility as defined in Section
64-13-1 or any public jail or other place of confinement
shall be sentenced to a penalty one degree greater than
provided in Subsection (2Kb).
(d) Upon a second or subsequent conviction of possession of any controlled substance by a person, that person
shall be sentenced to a one degree greater penalty than
provided in this Subsection (2).
(e) Any person who violates Subsection (2)(aXi) with
respect to all other controlled substances not included in
Subsection (2XbXi), (ii), or (iii), including less than one
ounce of marijuana, is guilty of a class B misdemeanor.
Upon a second conviction the person is guilty of a class A
misdemeanor, and upon a third or subsequent conviction
the person is guilty of a third degree felony
(f) Any person convicted of violating Subsection
(2)(a)(ii) or (2)(a)(iii) is:
(i) on a first conviction, guilty of a class B misdemeanor;
(ii) on a second conviction, guilty of a class A
misdemeanor; and
(iii) on a third or subsequent conviction, guilty of a
third degree felony.
(g) A person is subject to the penalties under Subsection (4)(c) who, in an offense not amounting to a violation
of Section 76-5-207:
(i) violates Subsection (2)(a)(i) by knowingly and
intentionally having in his body any measurable
amount of a controlled substance; and
(ii) operates a motor vehicle as defined in Section
76-5-207 in a negligent manner, causing serious bodily injury as defined in Section 76-1-601 or the death
of another.
(3) Prohibited acts C — Penalties:
(a) It is unlawful for any person knowingly and intentionally:
(i) to use in the course of the manufacture or
distribution of a controlled substance a license number which is fictitious, revoked, suspended, or issued
to another person or, for the purpose of obtaining a
controlled substance, to assume the title of, or represent himself to be, a manufacturer, wholesaler, apothecary, physician, dentist, veterinarian, or other authorized person;
(ii) to acquire or obtain possession of, to procure or
attempt to procure the administration of, to obtain a
prescription for, to prescribe or dispense to any person known to be attempting to acquire or obtain
possession of, or to procure the administration of any
controlled substance by misrepresentation or failure
by the person to disclose his receiving any controlled
substance from another source, fraud, forgery, deception, subterfuge, alteration of a prescription or written order for a controlled substance, or the use of a
false name or address;
(iii) to make any false or forged prescription or
written order for a controlled substance, or to utter
the same, or to alter any prescription or written order
issued or written under the terms of this chapter; or
(iv) to make, distribute, or possess any punch, die,
plate, stone, or other thing designed to print, imprint,
or reproduce the trademark, trade name, or other
identifying mark, imprint, or device of another or any
likeness of any of the foregoing upon any drug or
container or labeling so as to render any drug a
counterfeit controlled substance.

(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (3Xf
is guilty of a third degree felony.
(4) Prohibited acts D — Penalties:
(a) Notwithstanding other provisions of this section,
person not authorized under this chapter who commit
any act declared to be unlawful under this section, Titl
58, Chapter 37a, Utah Drug Paraphernalia Act, or unde
Title 58, Chapter 37b, Imitation Controlled Substance
Act, is upon conviction subject to the penalties an
classifications under this Subsection (4) if the act i
committed:
(i) in a public or private elementary or secondar
school or on the grounds of any of those schools;
(ii) in a public or private vocational school o
postsecondary institution or on the grounds of any c
those schools or institutions;
(iii) in those portions of any building, park, sta
dium, or other structure or grounds which are, at th
time of the act, being used for an activity sponsore
by or through a school or institution under Subse<
tions (4)(a)(i) and (ii);
(iv) in or on the grounds of a preschool or child-car
facility;
(v) in a public park, amusement park, arcade, o
recreation center;
(vi) in or on the grounds of a house of worship a
defined in Section 76-10-501;
(vii) in a shopping mall, sports facility, stadiun
arena, theater, movie house, playhouse, or parking lc
or structure adjacent thereto;
(viii) in a public parking lot or structure;
(ix) within 1,000 feet of any structure, facility, c
grounds included in Subsections (4)(a)(i) throug
(viii); or
(x) in the immediate presence of a person younge
than 18 years of age, regardless of where the ac
occurs.
(b) A person convicted under this Subsection (4) i
guilty of a first degree felony and shall be imprisoned fo
a term of not less than five years if the penalty that woul
otherwise have been established but for this subsectio
would have been a first degree felony. Imposition o
execution of the sentence may not be suspended, and th
person is not eligible for probation.
(c) If the classification that would otherwise have bee
established would have been less than a first degre
felony but for this Subsection (4), a person convicte
under Subsection (2)(g) or this Subsection (4) is guilty <
one degree more than the maximum penalty prescribe
for that offense.
(d) It is not a defense to a prosecution under thi
Subsection (4) that the actor mistakenly believed th
individual to be 18 years of age or older at the time of th
offense or was unaware of the individual's true age; nc
that the actor mistakenly believed that the location whef
the act occurred was not as described in Subsection (4X*
or was unaware that the location where the act occurre
was as described in Subsection (4Xa).
(5) Any violation of this chapter for which no penalty i
specified is a class B misdemeanor.
(6) (a) Any penalty imposed for violation of this section i
in addition to, and not in lieu of, any civil or administrt
tive penalt}' or sanction authorized by law.
(b) Where violation of this chapter violates a fedefl
law or the law of another state, conviction or acquitt*
under federal law or the law of another state for the satf
act is a bar to prosecution in this state.
(7) In any prosecution for a violation of this chapter, e v
dence or proof which shows a person or persons produce*
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manufactured, possessed, distributed, or dispensed a controlled substance or substances, is prima facie evidence that
*ke person or persons did so with knowledge of the character
0 f the substance or substances.
(g) This section does not prohibit a veterinarian, in good
faith and in the course of his professional practice only and not
for humans, from prescribing, -dispensing, or administering
controlled substances or from causing the substances to be
administered by an assistant or orderly under his direction
and supervision.
(9) Civil or criminal liability may not be imposed under this
section on:
(a) any person registered under the Controlled Substances Act who manufactures, distributes, or possesses
an imitation controlled substance for use as a placebo or
investigational new drug by a registered practitioner in
the ordinary course of professional practice or research; or
(b) any law enforcement officer acting in the course and
legitimate scope of his employment.
(10) If any provision of this chapter, or the application of
any provision to any person or circumstances, is held invalid,
the remainder of this chapter shall be given effect without the
invalid provision or application.
2003
68-37-8.5. Applicability of Title 76 prosecutions u n d e r
this chapter.
Unless specifically excluded in or inconsistent with the
provisions of this chapter, the provisions of Title 76, Chapters
1, 2, 3, and 4, are fully applicable to prosecutions under this
chapter.
1&97
58-37-9. Investigators — Status of peace officers.
Investigators for the Department of Commerce shall, for the
purpose of enforcing the provisions of this chapter, have the
status of peace officers.
1995
68-37-10.

S e a r c h warrants — Administrative inspection warrants — Inspections and seizures of
property without warrant.
(1) Search warrants relating to offenses involving controlled substances may be authorized in the same manner as
provided in Title 77, Chapter 23.
(2) Issuance and execution of administrative inspection
warrants shall be as follows:
(a) Any judge or magistrate of this state within his
jurisdiction upon proper oath or affirmation showing
probable cause, may issue warrants for the purpose of
conducting administrative inspections authorized by this
act or regulations thereunder and seizures of property
appropriate to such inspections. Probable cause for purposes of this act exists upon showing a valid public
interest in the effective enforcement of the act or rules
promulgated thereunder sufficient to justify administrative inspection of the area, premises, building, or conveyance in the circumstances specified in the application for
the warrant.
(b) A warrant shall issue only upon an affidavit of an
officer or employee duly designated and having knowledge
of the facts alleged sworn to before a judge or magistrate
which establish the grounds for issuing the warrant. If
the judge or magistrate is satisfied that grounds for the
application exist or that there is probable cause to believe
they exist, he shall issue a warrant identifying the area,
premises, building, or conveyance to be inspected, the
purpose of the inspection, and if appropriate, the type of
property to be inspected, if any. The warrant shall:
(i) state the grounds for its issuance and the name
of each person whose affidavit has been taken to
support it;
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(ii) be directed to a person authorized by Section
58-37-9 of this act to execute it;
(iii) command the person to whom it is directed to
inspect the area, premises, building, or conveyance
identified for the purpose specified and if appropriate,
direct the seizure of the property specified;
(iv) identify the item or types of property to be
seized, if any;
(v) direct that it be served during normal business
hours and designate the judge or magistrate to whom
it shall be returned.
(c) A warrant issued pursuant to this section must be
executed and returned within ten days after its date
unless, upon a showing of a need for additional time, the
court instructs otherwise in the warrant If property is
seized pursuant to a warrant, the person executing the
warrant shall give to the person from whom or from
whose premises the property was taken a copy of the
warrant and a receipt for the property taken or leave the
copy and receipt at the place where the property was
taken. Return of the warrant shall be made promptly and
be accompanied by a written inventory of any property
taken. The inventory shall be made in the presence of the
person executing the warrant and of the person from
whose possession or premises the property was taken, if
they are present, or in the presence of at least one credible
person other than the person executing the warrant. A
copy of the inventory shall be delivered to the person from
whom or from whose premises the property was taken
and to the applicant for the warrant.
(d) The judge or magistrate who issued the warrant
under this section shall attach a copy of the return and all
other papers to the warrant and file them with the court.
(3) The department is authorized to make administrative
inspections of controlled premises in accordance with the
following provisions:
(a) For purposes of this section only, "controlled premises" means:
(i) Places where persons licensed or exempted from
licensing requirements under this act are required to
keep records.
(ii) Places including factories, warehouses, establishments, and conveyances where persons licensed
or exempted from licensing requirements are permitted to possess, manufacture, compound, process, sell,
deliver, or otherwise dispose of any controlled substance.
(b) When authorized by an administrative inspection
warrant a law enforcement officer or employee designated
in Section 58-37-9, upon presenting the warrant and
appropriate credentials to the owner, operator, or agent in
charge, h a s the right to enter controlled premises for the
purpose of conducting an administrative inspection.
(c) When authorized by an administrative inspection
warrant, a law enforcement officer or employee designated in Section 58-37-9 has the right:
(i) l b inspect and copy records required by this act.
(ii) l b inspect within reasonable limits and a reasonable manner, the controlled premises and all pertinent equipment, finished and unfinished material,
containers, and labeling found, and except as provided in Subsection (3He), all other things including
records, files, papers, processes, controls, and facilities subject to regulation and control by this act or by
rules promulgated by the department.
(iii) To inventory and stock of any controlled substance and obtain samples of any substance.
(d) This section shall not be construed to prevent the
inspection of books and records without a warrant pursu-
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The motion shall be filed prior to the filing of the appellant's
brief Upon a showing of good cause, the court may permit a
motion to be filed after the filing of the appellant's brief In no
event shall the court permit a motion to be filed after oral
argument Nothing in this rule shall prohibit the court from
remanding the case under this rule on its own motion at any
time if the claim has been raised and the motion would have
been available to a party
(b) Content of motion, response, reply The content of the
motion shall conform to the requirements of Rule 23 The
motion shall include or be accompanied by affidavits alleging
facts not fully appearing in the record on appeal that show the
claimed deficient performance of the attorney The affidavits
shall also allege facts that show the claimed prejudice suffered
by the appellant as a result of the claimed deficient perfor
mance The motion shall also be accompanied by a proposed
order or remand that identifies the ineffectiveness claims and
specifies the factual issues relevant to each such claim to be
addressed on remand
A response shall be filed within 20 days after the motion is
filed The response shall include a proposed order of remand
that identifies the ineffectiveness claims and specifies the
factual issues relevant to each such claim to be addressed by
the trial court in the event remand is granted, unless the
responding party accepts that proposed by the moving party
Any reply shall be filed within 10 days after the response is
filed
(c) Order of the court If the requirements of parts (a) and
(b) of this rule have been met, the court may order that the
case be temporarily remanded to the trial court for the
purpose of entry of findings of fact relevant to a claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel The order of remand shall
identify the ineffectiveness claims and specify the factual
issues relevant to each such claim to be addressed by the trial
court The order shall also direct the trial court to complete the
proceedings on remand within 90 days of issuance of the order
of remand, absent a finding by the trial court of good cause for
a delay of reasonable length
If it appears to the appellate court that the appellant's
attorney of record on the appeal faces a conflict of interest
upon remand, the court shall direct that counsel withdraw
and that new counsel for the appellant be appointed or
retained
(d) Effect on appeal Oral argument and the deadlines for
bnefs shall be vacated upon the filing of a motion to remand
under this rule Other procedural steps required by these
rules shall not be stayed by a motion for remand, unless a stay
is ordered by the court upon stipulation or motion of the
parties or upon the court's motion
(e) Proceedings before the trial court Upon remand the trial
court shall promptly conduct hearings and take evidence as
necessary to enter the findings of fact necessary to determine
the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel Any claims of
ineffectiveness not identified in the order of remand shall not
be considered by the trial court on remand, unless the trial
court determines that the interests of justice or judicial
efficiency require consideration of issues not specifically iden
tified in the order of remand Evidentiary hearings shall be
conducted without a jury and as soon as practicable after
remand The burden of proving a fact shall be upon the
proponent of the fact The standard of proof shall be a
preponderance of the evidence The trial court shall enter
written findings of fact concerning the claimed deficient per
formance by counsel and the claimed prejudice suffered by
appellant as a result, in accordance with the order of remand
Proceedings on remand shall be completed within 90 days of
entry of the order of remand, unless the trial court finds good
cause for a delay of reasonable length

Rule 24

(f) Preparation and transmittal of the record At the conclu
sion of all proceedings before the trial court the clerk of the
trial court and the court reporter shall immediately prepare
the record of the supplemental proceedings as required by
these rules If the record of the original proceedings before the
trial court has been transmitted to the appellate court the
clerk of the trial court shall immediately transmit the record
of the supplemental proceedings upon preparation of the
supplemental record If the record of the original proceedings
before the trial court has not been transmitted to the appellate
court, the clerk of the court shall transmit the record of the
supplemental proceedings upon the preparation of the entire
record
(g) Appellate court determination
Upon receipt of the
record from the trial court the clerk of the court shall notify
the parties of the new schedule for briefing or oral argument
under these rules Errors claimed to have been made during
the trial court proceedings conducted pursuant to this rule are
reviewable under the same standards as the review of errors
in other appeals The findings of fact entered pursuant to this
rule are reviewable under the same standards as the review of
findings of fact in other appeals
Rule 24. Briefs
(a) Brief of the appellant The brief of the appellant shall
contain under appropriate headings and in the order mdi
cated
(a)(1) A complete list of all parties to the proceeding in the
court or agency whose judgment or order is sought to be
reviewed, except where the caption of the case on appeal
contains the names of all such parties The list should be set
out on a separate page which appears immediately inside the
cover
(a)(2) A table of contents, including the contents of the
addendum, with page references
(a)(3) A table of authorities with cases alphabetically ar
ranged and with parallel citations, rules, statutes and other
authorities cited, with references to the pages of the brief
where they are cited
(a)(4) A brief statement showing the jurisdiction of the
appellate court
(a)(5) A statement of the issues presented for review, in
eluding for each issue the standard of appellate review with
supporting authority, and
(a)(5)(A) citation to the record showing that the issue was
preserved in the trial court, or
(aX5XB) a statement of grounds for seeking review of an
issue not preserved in the trial court
(a)(6) Constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, rules,
and regulations whose interpretation is determinative of the
appeal or of central importance to the appeal shall be set out
verbatim with the appropriate citation If the pertinent part of
the provision is lengthy, the citation alone will suffice, and the
provision shall be set forth in an addendum to the bnef under
paragraph (11) of this rule
(a)(7) A statement of the case The statement shall first
indicate briefly the nature of the ca 3e, the course of proceed
ings, and its disposition in the court below A statement of the
facts relevant to the issues presented for review shall follow
All statements of fact and references to the proceedings below
shall be supported by citations to the record in accordance
with paragraph (e) of this rule
(a)(8) Summary of arguments The summary of arguments,
suitably paragraphed, shall be a succinct condensation of the
arguments actually made in the body of the brief It shall not
be a mere repetition of the heading under which the argument
is arranged

(a)(9) An argument. The argument shall contain the contentions and reasons of the appellant with respect to the
issues presented, including the grounds for reviewing any
issue not preserved in the trial court, with citations to the
authorities, statutes, and parts of the record relied on. A party
challenging a fact finding must first marshal all record evidence that supports the challenged finding.
(aXlO) A short conclusion stating the precise relief sought.
(aXll) An addendum to the brief or a statement that no
addendum is necessary under this paragraph. The addendum
shall be bound as part of the brief unless doing so makes the
brief unreasonably thick. If the addendum is bound separately, the addendum shall contain a table of contents. The
addendum shall contain a copy of:
(a)(ll)(A) any constitutional provision, statute, rule, or
regulation of central importance cited in the brief but not
reproduced verbatim in the brief;
(a)(HXB) in cases being reviewed on certiorari, a copy of
the Court of Appeals opinion; in all cases any court opinion of
central importance to the appeal but not available to the court
as part of a regularly published reporter service; and
(aXllXC) those parts of the record on appeal that are of
central importance to the determination of the appeal, such as
the challenged instructions, findings of fact and conclusions of
law, memorandum decision, the transcript of the court's oral
decision, or the contract or document subject to construction.
(b) Brief of the appellee. The brief of the appellee shall
conform to the requirements of paragraph (a) of this rule,
except that the appellee need not include:
(b)(1) a statement of the issues or of the case unless the
appellee is dissatisfied with the statement of the appellant; or
(bX2) an addendum, except to provide material not included in the addendum of the appellant. The appellee may
refer to the addendum of the appellant.
(c) Reply brief The appellant may file a brief in reply to the
brief of the appellee, and if the appellee has cross-appealed,
the appellee may file a brief in reply to the response of the
appellant to the issues presented by the cross-appeal. Reply
briefs shall be limited to answering any new matter set forth
in the opposing brief. The content of the reply brief shall
conform to the requirements of paragraph (a)(2), (3), (9), and
(10) of this rule. No further briefs may be filed except with
leave of the appellate court.
(d) References in briefs to parties. Counsel will be expected
in their briefs and oral arguments to keep to a minimum
references to parties by such designations as "appellant'' and
"appellee." It promotes clarity to use the designations used in
the lower court or in the agency proceedings, or the actual
names of parties, or descriptive terms such as "the employee,"
"the injured person," "the taxpayer," etc.
(e) References in briefs to the record. References shall be
made to the pages of the original record as paginated pursuant
to Rule 1Kb) or to pages of any statement of the evidence or
proceedings or agreed statement prepared pursuant to Rule
11(f) or 11(g). References to pages of published depositions or
transcripts shall identify the sequential number of the cover
page of each volume as marked by the clerk on the bottom
right corner and each separately numbered page(s) referred to
within the deposition or transcript as marked by the transcriber. References to exhibits shall be made to the exhibit
numbers. If reference is made to evidence the admissibility of
which is in controversy, reference shall be made to the pages of
the record at which the evidence was identified, offered, and
received or rejected.
(f) Length of briefs. Except by permission of the court,
principal briefs shall not exceed 50 pages, and reply briefs
shall not exceed 25 pages, exclusive of pages containing the
table of contents, tables of citations and any addendum

containing statutes, rules, regulations, or portions of the
record as required by paragraph (a) of this rule. In cases
involving cross-appeals, paragraph (g) of this rule sets forth
the length of briefs.
(g) Briefs in cases involving cross-appeals. If a cross-appeal
is filed, the party first filing a notice of appeal shall be deemed
the appellant for the purposes of this rule and Rule 26, unless
the parties otherwise agree or the court otherwise orders. The
brief of the appellant shall not exceed 50 pages in length. The
brief of the appellee/cross-appellant shall contain the issues
and arguments involved in the cross-appeal as well as the
answer to the brief of the appellant and shall not exceed 50
pages in length. The appellant shall then file a brief which
contains an answer to the original issues raised by the
appellee/cross-appellant and a reply to the appellee's response
to the issues raised in the appellant's opening brief. The
appellant's second brief shall not exceed 25 pages in length.
The appellee/cross-appellant may then file a second brief, not
to exceed 25 pages in length, which contains only a reply to the
appellant's answers to the original issues raised by the appellee/cross-appellant's first brief. The lengths specified by this
rule are exclusive of table of contents, table of authorities, and
addenda and may be exceeded only by permission of the court.
The court shall grant reasonable requests, for good cause
shown.
(h) Briefs in cases involving multiple appellants or
appellees. In cases involving more than one appellant or
appellee, including cases consolidated for purposes of the
appeal, any number of either may join in a single brief, and
any appellant or appellee may adopt by reference any part of
the brief of another. Parties may similarly join in reply briefs.
(i) Citation of supplemental authorities. When pertinent
and significant authorities come to the attention of a party
after that party's brief has been filed, or after oral argument
but before decision, a party may promptly advise the clerk of
the appellate court, by letter setting forth the citations. An
original letter and nine copies shall be filed in the Supreme
Court. An original letter and seven copies shall be filed in the
Court of Appeals. There shall be a reference either to the page
of the brief or to a point argued orally to which the citations
pertain, but the letter shall without argument state the
reasons for the supplemental citations. Any response shall be
made within 7 days of filing and shall be similarly limited.
(j) Requirements and sanctions. All briefs under this rule
must be concise, presented with accuracy, logically arranged
with proper headings and free from burdensome, irrelevant,
immaterial or scandalous matters. Briefs which are not m
compliance may be disregarded or stricken, on motion or sua
sponte by the court, and the court may assess attorney fees
against the offending lawyer.
Rule 25. Brief of a n amicus curiae or guardian ad litem.
A brief of an amicus curiae or of a guardian ad litem
representing a minor who is not a party to the appeal may be
filed only if accompanied by written consent of all parties, or
by leave of court granted on motion or at the request of the
court. A motion for leave shall identify the interest of the
applicant and shall state the reasons why a brief of an amicus
curiae or t h e guardian ad litem is desirable. Except as a'
parties otherwise consent, an amicus curiae or guardian a
litem shall file its brief within the time allowed the party
whose position as to affirmance or reversal the amicus curiae
or guardian ad litem will support, unless the court for cause
shown otherwise orders. A motion of an amicus curiae o
guardian ad litem to participate in the oral argument will o*
granted when circumstances warrant in the court's discretio

